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Esta dissertação examina manipulação de resultados em aquisições. Em 
particular, avalia se empresas adquirentes, com restrições financeiras, 
manipulam mais em comparação com empresas adquirentes sem restrições 
financeiras. Adicionalmente, esta dissertação avalia o uso do earnout e a sua 
eficácia na redução da manipulação dos resultados.  
Os resultados empíricos, usando dois tipos de modelos de manipulação de 
resultados (accruals e real activity management), demonstam que os adquirentes 
com restrições financeiras não parecem manipular mais do que os adquirentes 
sem restrições financeiras no período anterior à aquisição. Os resultados 
sugerem ainda que os adquirentes que utilizam earnout como forma de 
pagamento estão associados a um menor nível de manipulação de resultados 
por via de accruals. Os resultados sugerem também que os adquirentes que 
adquirem empresas estrangeiras ou empresas noutro setor através de earnout, 
estão associados a um menor nível de manipulação de resultados por via de real 
activity management. Conclui-se assim que a utilização de earnout como método 
de pagamento reduz o nível de manipulação de resutados dos adquirentes e, 
consequentemente, aumenta a qualidade dos resultados.  
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This work examines whether and how constrained acquirers are showing 
higher levels of earnings management in the past financial statements 
compared to unconstrained acquirer. Further, this paper contributes to the 
growing literature on the use of earnout and its effectiveness to reduce earnings 
management. The empirical results, using both accruals management and real 
activity management models, show that constrained acquirers do not 
experience higher levels of earnings management in the period before the 
acquisition. Further, the results demonstrate that bidders using earnout as 
method of payment are associated to lower level of earnings management in 
their past financial statement via discretionary accruals. Also, the results 
suggest that bidders that enter in foreign and diversifying acquisitions 
involving earnouts report lower levels of real earnings manipulation. 
Moreover, earnout as method of payment reduces the level of earnings 
management from a bidder’s perspective, thus increasing earnings quality. 
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In a highly competitive environment, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are crucial 
events for corporations in terms of both development and growth. A company’s 
main purpose is to increase its value of stocks to the maximum possible extent. 
Consequently, bidders as well as target firms, have numerous motivations to engage 
in earnings management (manipulation) prior to the acquisition deal. 
Prior research (Campa & Hajbaba, 2016; Elnahas, Kabir Hassan, & Ismail, 2017) 
mostly shows the relevance of earnings manipulation in target firms. Less attention 
has been given to the acquirer’s earnings management behavior. Therefore, we 
examine the role of earnings management on the acquirer’s side. There are two main 
ways through which an acquirer can manipulate its earnings. The first one consists 
in altering discretionary accruals and the second one is known under the real 
activity management (RAM). In this case companies manipulate discretionary 
expenses to impact its earnings. Specifically, it will be investigated whether 
constrained acquirers, in the period prior to the acquisition, experience higher levels 
of earnings manipulation than unconstrained bidders. In a perfect market place with 
no frictions, as described by Modigliani and Miller (Modigliani & Miller, 1958), 
financing decisions would not be relevant. Given that there are financial distress 
costs and private information, before acquiring a firm, a bidder should carefully 
analyze the different sources of funding which are available. Financially constrained 
acquirers engage in mergers and acquisitions to benefit from potential synergies. In 
order to obtain funding constrained acquirers use earnings manipulation practices to 
ease their constraints and to be able to finance valuable investments (Linck et al., 
2013). 
Besides, it will be examined if earnout as method of payment reduce acquirer’s 
earnings manipulation (which increases earnings quality) in domestic acquisitions as 
well as in cross-border and cross-industry acquisitions. In general there are four 
different payment methods: all-cash payment, all-stock payment, mixed payment 




clauses became increasingly popular. Earnout agreements are contracts which allow 
to reduce the valuation gap and the information asymmetry between the acquirer 
and the target about the real value of the latter (Kohers and Ang, 2000). Due to this 
reason, the earnout should be included, especially in the cross-border transactions, 
cross-industry and private acquisitions (Barbopoulos & Sudarsanam, 2012; Cain, 
Denis, & Denis, 2011). Given that earnouts reduce the uncertainty of acquisitions for 
the bidders and the acquirers, both parties are less incentivized to engage in 
earnings manipulation. Viarengo et al. (2016) demonstrate that acquirers using 
earnout have lower levels of earnings management via discretionary accruals. The 
authors show that acquirers using earnout report higher earnings quality to 
demonstrate the trustworthiness of the financial statements. 
In order to examine the research questions above, we follow a two-step 
procedure. In the first step, we estimate acquirers’ earnings management prior to the 
acquisition, using two models; an accrual based model (Modified Jones-Model, 1995) 
and a real activity management model (Roychowdhury, 2006). In the second step, 
these earnings management measures (absolute discretionary accruals and absolute 
abnormal discretionary expenses) are used to evaluate the research hypotheses. 
The analysis is based on a sample of US bidders involved in acquisitions from 
1996 until 2014. The data related to the acquisition (e. g. acquisition date, target 
nation) are obtained from the ThomsonOne database whereas accounting 
information are obtained from the Compustat database. Yearly data are used to 
classify acquirers into constrained and unconstrained while the earnings 
management models are estimated via quarterly data.  
The empirical evidence suggests that the financially constrained acquirers do not 
show higher levels of earnings management than financially unconstrained 
acquirers. Second, the results show that earnout as a method of payment reduces the 
level of earnings manipulation in the acquirers’ past financial statements. Also, the 
results suggest that acquirers using earnout in cross-border and diversifying 
acquisitions have lower levels of earnings management via discretionary expenses. 
The remainder of this work is organized as follow: Section 2 summarizes the 
literature review concerning method of payment and earnings management. Section 
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3 describes the research hypotheses, Section 4 presents the econometric approach, 




2. Literature review  
 
2.1. The Choice of payment methods in acquisitions deals 
2.1.1. Waves and trends in Mergers and Acquisitions 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) are operations with a great impact on the 
stakeholders’ value of both, bidders and targets. The total value invested for M&A 
has grown dramatically over the time reaching trillion of dollars in recent years1. 
This work examines the most significant waves that occurred in the last century and 
provides a global overview of current trends and volume of M&A by sector. 
Previous studies highlight that M&A are repeating over the time, therefore can be 
clustered in different waves. US and Europe are considered as the two main markets 
for value of concluded M&A value. Therefore, following Sudarsanam (Sudarsanam, 
2003)2, M&A past trends have been analyzed, and five waves have been identified. 
The first wave lasted from 1890-1900, a period which was characterized by a 
phase of economic expansion. One of the major motivations for companies to merge 
in that period was to obtain a monopolistic and oligopolistic control of the market. A 
flourishing economic situation, leveraged by the second industrial revolution helped 
the M&A industry to grow. Some of the actual largest companies were created 
during this period, as for example General Electric.  
The second wave ended in the 1920s. A major event of this second wave was the 
implementation of new legislation which aimed at banning monopolistic mergers. 
                                                                    
1 Thomson Reuters, Mergers & Acquisitions Review 2017 




The impact of the second wave was less disruptive than the first one and collapsed 
with the stock market crash in 1929.  
The third wave was extended over a longer period and ended in 1971. The 
intention of companies involved in M&A was to start a diversification process. This 
diversification was pursued by the acquisition of unrelated companies or businesses.  
The fourth wave occurred from the early 1980s to 1990. Surprisingly, during this 
period companies were focusing on selling part of their businesses which they 
considered not to be “core business” anymore. This trend went against the previous 
drift of diversification of the 1960s. The return to some selected core activities is also 
called “a round trip” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). More in general, the fourth wave 
tried to narrow down the activity and new forms of acquiring companies such as 
leveraged buyouts (LBO) and hostile takeovers emerged.  
The fifth wave of the early 90s until 2003 followed the same logic as the fourth 
one. It focalized on core activities which were seen as major source of competitive 
advantage. In terms of value of M&A the fifth wave registered 1.8 trillion of dollars 
in 20003. This M&A wave was favored by the start of globalization of products 
services and capital markets and ultimately the development and spread of the 
internet.  
Similarly to what occurred in the USA market, the M&A activity in Europe 
experienced a similar evolution with similar patterns. The main difference between 
the USA and the European M&A activity is related to the size of the deals. In 
Europe, United Kingdom has known an important history in mergers and 
acquisitions.  
Nowadays, the number of deals and values of transactions are enormous. 
According to Thomson Reuters, in 2017, the worldwide announced M&A activity 
achieved a total USD 3.6 trillion4. It was the fourth consecutive year that recorded 
over 3 trillion of US dollars in M&A transactions.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of mergers and acquisition in terms of total 
completed deal value from 2010 until 2017, a constant increase in M&A activity can 
                                                                    
3 Numbers taken from;  Creating Value form Mergers and acquisitions, Sudi Sudarsanam (2003) page 16 of 
615 
4
 Mergers & Acquisitions Review; Full Year 2017, Thomson Reuters 
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be recognized. It can be noted a slightly decrease from 2016 to 2017 but nevertheless, 
these years recorded the higher expansion of M&A. 
 
Figure 1 Evolution of total deal value in M&A in millions of USD 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Mergers & Acquisitions Review, 2010-2017 
 
 
There exist some other perspectives beside the time series analysis that explain how 
and when M&A occur such as an environmental and economic analysis. Some 
Scholars, attributed different explanations to the occurrence of M&A, based on an 
environmental analysis, two principal ideas can be retained.  
First, Michael Gort explained the waves of M&A by developing the economic 
disturbance theory of merger waves (Gort, 1969). The idea underlying this concept is 
that a phase of economic expansion generates different expectations on future 
demand which lead to disequilibrium in the market. Companies want to benefit 
from potential undervaluation of target firms and start a M&A process. Hence, 
competitors fear to miss the momentum and to lose market power.  Therefore, they 
will follow the M&A movement and a M&A “wave” is created. Gort´s model holds 
and coincides for the merger waves identified before in this paper. 
  Following the Political Economic Social and Technical (PEST) perspective, the first 
wave of 1890 can be explained by the technological enhancements which affected 
business models and activities of companies.  Other changes such as tax regulation 
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Moreover, different political, economic, social events motivated companies to 
look for opportunities outside of the home-country. These transactions are defined 
as cross-border acquisitions.  
Another perspective can be taken into consideration which explains that M&A are 
occurring due the economic expectation of the firms. The rational underlying this 
perspective is that firms acquire and merge to obtain costs reduction and strengthen 
their market power. Companies can decrease their costs and increase their market 
power in different ways: a first alternative to obtain cost reduction via merger and 
acquisition is to follow economies of scale. Economies of scale helps to increase 
production meanwhile cost are being reduced. Costs are spread over larger volumes 
of production which reduces cost per unit and results in gain of efficiency. Secondly, 
acquiring firms achieve cost reduction through economies of learning which allow to 
reduce the costs through the specific know-how of the acquired firm. This type of 
economies is betting on organizational efficiency and a more efficient production. 
Lastly, economies of scope can be the goal of bidders when acquiring a target. This 
means that firms try to focus on a variety of products and are diversifying more. 
 
2.1.2. Determinants of choice of payment methods (cash, stock, mixed) 
Mergers and acquisitions are crucial events for the companies which are involved in 
the transaction. Hence, the choice of the payment method to finance the acquisition 
is considered one of the key factors of success of such a deal. The consideration 
which has to be paid depends on several factors such as the estimation of potential 
synergies and the premium paid. In general, this consideration can be paid in 
different forms: all-cash also, all-stock and mixed that include both all-stock and all-
cash  (Faccio & Masulis, 2005).  
Each method of payment has a different impact and it has some advantages and 
some limits. Prior research highlights (Myers & Majluf, 1984) the impact of private 
information which creates a gap between target and acquirers view of the deal value. 
Due to this, the selection of the right between payment method is crucial given the 
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possibility to reduce the evaluation risk that the acquirer has to afford given the 
existence of asymmetric information between the counterparts. 
Before examining each method of payment, it is relevant to identify the possible 
ways that a bidder can find to finance the acquisition. Usually, companies have two 
alternatives to raise financial resources: they can access the debt market. This 
possibility relies heavily on the existing leverage and debt capacity of a company. 
Bidders with high levels of leverage may have difficulties to issue new debt as they 
face elevated distress cost. Thus, acquirers with high leverage levels tend not to use 
cash as method of payment in M&A (DePamphilis, 2017). The second possibility is to 
issue new equity which potentially affects the control of the company. Hence, 
companies are facing a trade-off between distress cost of debt and control issues by 
issuing new debt.  
Following the Pecking order theory (Myers, 1984), companies first choose internal 
funds due to adverse selection risk. In case that external financing is necessary firms 
then issue debt before an equity issuance. Companies follow a two-step strategy 
(Fischer, 2017): first of all firms determine whether external funding is needed to 
proceed with the acquisition or not. If external funding is needed, other factors such 
as target´s characteristics become relevant to choose between debt financing or 
equity issuance. Fischer identifies several facts related to internal financing: the 
acquirers use internal financing for smaller takeovers and for larger ones they seek 
external sources. Companies rely on internal financing if their cash level is 
sufficiently large and they do not experience high levels of leverage. According to 
another stream of past theories of capital structure, firms follow a certain target 
capital structure but tend  to drift away from these targets and thereby affect the cost 
of debt and debt capacities (Uysal, 2011; Frank & Goyal, 2007).  
In the context of M&A, managers of acquiring firms apply the same criteria 
(Uysal, 2011). If companies seek for acquisitions, they are willing to change their 
capital structure, if necessary. Companies with relative high leverage ratios are less 
likely to proceed with acquisitions because and are less likely to include all-cash 




by company´s concern regarding cost of capital followed by agency cost as well as 
the methods of payment (Martynova & Renneboog, 2009). 
Therefore, the financial health of companies can heavily impact the choice of 
payment method in mergers and acquisitions. Bidders which are suffering from 
financial constraints are sometimes not able to finance all profitable projects and 
therefore choose financing policies based on the profitability of current and future 
investments (Almeida, 2004). Past studies (Almeida, 2004) demonstrated that 
constrained firms should systematically save cash from cash flows to face financing 
needs. Prior studies underlined that (Faulkender & Wang, 2006) cash holdings are 
form more important for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms.  
An acquirer can opt to finance the acquisition with an all cash offer due to a 
variety of reasons among other: (i) usage of excess cash, (ii) to maintain the 
shareholder structure. In the cash offers, the deal value is known at the date in which 
the transaction occurs and it does not depend from other factors such as future 
performances. Additionally, it allows a simple valuation of the deal and it designates 
a clear end for target shareholders. Besides, cash offers are more likely to occur when 
bidders have special access to the debt market, such as access to bank loans or they 
can easily borrow due to the presence of interlocking directors (Faccio & Masulis, 
2005).  
Further, prior studies identify that a company´s credit rating influences the choice 
of the method of payment. Thanks to the higher creditworthiness, highly rated firms 
have lower financial constraints and easy access to debt markets which ultimately 
raises the likelihood of cash payments in M&A activities (Karampatsas, Petmezas, & 
Travlos, 2014).  Another study (Billett, Garfinkel, & O’Neal, 1998) underlines that 
firms that have higher credit ratings face lower cost of debts than lower rated firms. 
The lower cost of debt, can lead to a higher debt capacity as it is convenient to 
borrow financial resources.  
Moreover, prior researches recognized that the size of the bidder influences the 
way of financing and the method of payment used in the deal. Larger firms tend to 
be more diversified, and given that they are perceives as “less risky” normally they 
experience lower bankruptcy cost. Thus, the access to debt financing is easier and a 
23 
 
cash payment is more reasonable. Also, the relative size of both bidder and target 
impacts on the choice of payment method. The likelihood of acquiring a relatively 
large target with an all-cash payment is lower as it is more difficult to obtain large 
financing sources (Ismail & Krause, 2010). 
Usually, cash offers are linked to the high level of confidence of the bidder 
(Barbopoulos & Sudarsanam, 2012). The cash payment is used especially when 
bidders expect that the target has a high potential and that the operation will 
generate positive synergies. However, post-acquisition, target shareholders in all-
cash offers are subject to a potential opportunity if the value generated from the 
operation which exceeds the premium received included in the total consideration.  
Lastly, in the acquisitions financed by all-cash, both acquirers and bidders need to 
examine carefully the effects of fiscal policy. Countries which are favorable in terms 
of tax deductions are more attractive for cash offers than others. This is due to the 
nature of cash offers, in which taxation is liable on the profits of the transaction 
(DePamphilis, 2017; Ismail & Krause, 2010). In that case, targets require higher 
premiums to compensate these expenses, which implies that other methods of 
payment are possibly more convenient such as the stock payments.  
An alternative to the all-cash offer is the all-stock payment. This method of 
payment methods relies heavily on the existence of asymmetric information 
(Hansen, 1987). In fact, both, acquirers and targets are speculating that the 
counterparty has more information about the real value of the deal. Hence, bidders 
try to finance the acquisition by offering its own stocks to reduce the risk of an 
overvaluation of the target’s equity. 
This concept can also be connected to the adverse selection theory. From the  
acquirer side, the adverse selection is associated to the overvaluation of the target, 
known as “Lemon problem” (Akerlof, 1970). A similar issue is afforded by the target 
which could receive overvalued bidder’s stock.  
Moreover, a stock payment allows bidders to minimize the risk of valuation post 
acquisition, especially when the target is performing poorly and share price is 
decreasing. On the other side, target shareholders can benefit from the stock 




counterparty agrees on an exchange ratio5 which will embody the transaction value 
of the deal. The benefit of the stock payment is just known ex-ante and it depends on 
the variation of the price return.  
 Also, the stock offer leads to a “dilution effect” when new shares are issued and 
thus affect the existing shareholder’s structure. In terms of corporate control the 
stock payment does not represent the optimal choice, it would be better to offer an 
alternative method of payment. This effect is even more pronounced when the target 
company has a medium or high concentration of shareholders (Faccio & Masulis, 
2005). A bidder, with a diffused ownership structure is less concerned about control 
issues and therefore it would offer a stock payment rather than cash.  
Furthermore, acquirers prefer stock financing and when the company believes 
that the stock price of its shares is overvalued (Hansen, 1987). The reasons behind 
this behavior is that the bidder is able to benefit from the overvalued perception of 
its share price to finance the M&A deal at a lower value as it has to issue less stock. 
The acquirer benefits from its private information vis-à-vis the target company. 
When the bidder´s management estimate their stock as undervalued, a different 
payment method is more likely to be chosen. The announcement effects linked to a 
stock payment differs whether the target firm is public or private (Chang, 1998). A 
firm acquiring a listed company with a substantial number of shareholders may be 
subject to asymmetric information which then leads to valuation risk. A new stock 
issue is perceived negatively by the market as managers have superior information 
about stock prices and price return on the announcement day will be negative 




                                                                    
5 Definition exchange ratio, Exchange ratio represents the number of shares an acquiring firm delivers for 




2.1.3. The earnout payment 
Both acquirers and targets face moral hazard and adverse selection risk when they 
enter in an acquisition. In order to reduce those risks and to reduce the risk of 
earnings management, bidders and targets can decide to include an earnout clause 
in the deal to overcome the valuation disagreement. Earnout contracts are 
particularly useful when there is high information asymmetry as in the case of deals 
that include: (i) private targets, (iii) cross-border acquisitions, (iv) industrial 
diversification (Kohers & Ang, 2000). In the specific case of private target companies, 
which are less subject to disclosure requirements, the information asymmetry is 
high. Therefore, in this case earnouts are really effective to reduce the risk (Kohers & 
Ang, 2000). 
Earnout, has been described as “a contingent form of payment used to finance an 
acquisition and involves a two-stage payment structure” (Barbopoulos & 
Sudarsanam, 2012).  
An earnout contract consists of a first stage which is an upfront payment to the 
target company and a deferred payment. The upfront payment is non-contingent 
and related to “the value agreed” between the companies. The second part is 
contingent and deferred. The deferred payment is conditional on the achievement of 
some specific performance goals by the target. For instance, if the target company 
reaches certain milestones (e.g. revenue goals), agreed and settled beforehand, based 
on the earnout contract, the acquirer will provide and an additional payment (the 
earnout value). Concerning the nature of the payment, both parts can either be in 
cash, stock or mixed payments. Moreover, it can also be considered as a hedging 
instrument (Kohers & Ang, 2000). It hedges the bidder for overpaying for a target. 
The bidder bears less risk as the payment is limited to the to the upfront first 
payment when the target does not achieve the forecasted outcomes. For the target 
company, earnouts are attractive when the management is optimistic about their 
future performance and the milestones are realistically achievable.  
Generally, the choice of the method of payment for the first installment as well as 
for the second one, are an important pillar in the financing strategy (Barbopoulos, 




deferred) by stock provides a signal of a more cautious behavior by the acquirer. 
Contrarily, paying both parts in cash signalizes confidence and it limits the value 
gain for the target shareholders to the premium paid.  
Therefore, earnouts are used to bridge the valuation gap which exists due to 
private information. Hence, earnouts are used more often when a bidder is acquiring 
a private company (Cain et al., 2011; Faccio & Masulis, 2005; Kohers & Ang, 2000).  
Another factor to take into consideration is the size of the company of both 
acquirer and target. Smaller bidders which are constraint in their financial ability 
may want to have some protection because they cannot bear the risk of 
misevaluation. Recently, some authors (Bates, Neyland, & Wang, 2018) highlight 
that earnouts are more likely to be used by companies which are facing financial 
constraints and during periods of stricter and tighter loan standards. These financial 
constraints can be from different nature as for example bad access to debt market. 
Earnouts can be considered as a source of financing for financially limited acquirers 
(Bates et al., 2018). By splitting the consideration in two different parts, bidders do 
not face the issue of raising the total deal value at once. The earnout gives the 
acquirer a certain financial flexibility and can be seen as financial slack as only the 
upfront payment is paid at the settlement date. The earnout payment is only due 
after a predefined period and the achievement of certain goals. This provides the 
acquirer some financial flexibility.  
Prior literature shows that acquisitions involving earnout contracts obtain higher 
abnormal return for the bidder’s shareholders at the announcement day compared 
to the other methods of payments (Barbopoulos & Sudarsanam, 2012; Kohers & Ang, 
2000). Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) highlight the impact of earnouts for both 
private and public acquisition deals. In private acquisitions, earnouts provide a 
positive gain for the acquirer larger than cash offers whereas there is no significant 
difference between the earnout and stock payments. This can be explained by the 
similar mitigation characteristics that both methods of payment are providing. For 
public acquisition deals, a same logic is highlighted by the authors, earnouts are 
more valuable than stock offers but not significantly different form cash offers. 
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Nonetheless, some obstacles and complications can affect the feasibility of earnout 
contract. As earnouts are clauses, terms can be renegotiated as contracts are seldom 
complete from the beginning. To renegotiate, all parties should agree which is not 
always easy given that some companies are represented by a large amount of 
shareholders (Kohers & Ang, 2000). Some side cost such as lawyer advisory fees 
must be taken into consideration when setting up an earnout contract. Besides the 
structural and organizational complexity of earnout contracts, other factors also 
explain why such contracts are used with precaution. Recently, Viarengo et al. (2018) 
demonstrated that the use of earnout contracts in mergers and acquisitions 
transactions is heavily relying on a country´s enforcement quality. This research 
shows a positive relationship between enforcement quality and the proportion of 
earnout in the M&A deal (Viarengo, Gatti, & Prencipe, 2018). Specifically, in the 




2.2. The influence of methods of payment on Earnings 
management  
2.2.1. Definition of Earnings quality 
According to the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No1 (Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, 1978); “Financial reporting should provide 
information about an enterprise´s financial performance during a period.”6 In other 
terms, earnings quality is providing information about a specific firm´s performance 
which is relevant for future decision making. If the quality of earnings is higher, 
more information about the characteristics of a firm´s financial performance are 
relevant to a specific decision made by a decision-maker (P. Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 
2010). 
                                                                    




Earnings quality is a broader concept than earnings management as it is related to 
the overall utility and relevance of earnings for each decision-maker. Even though 
prior research provides multiple definitions of earnings quality, the majority of the 
authors agree that there is not one exclusive appropriate measure of earnings 
quality, as each measurement proxy relates to a specific aspect of earnings 
quality(Dichev, Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2012; Diri, 2017). 
 
Prior research has identified high earnings quality in presence of: (i) Persistence and 
thus best measurement predictions of future earnings (Penman & Zhang, 2002), 
(ii)Predict future earnings in a more accurate way (Schipper & Vincent, 2003) (iii) 
Have small changes in total accruals that are not linked to fundamentals (Jones 1991, 
Kothari et al. 2005).  
The main aspects related to the concept of earnings quality are the following one: 
- Earnings persistence. Companies with more persistent earnings are 
perceived to have sustainable, regular earnings and cash flows (P. Dechow 
et al., 2010). A higher earnings persistence will ultimately make it a more 
consistent input for equity valuation. The problem commonly associated 
with earnings persistence is the dependence of the accounting 
measurement system. Restating, for short periods earnings persistence can 
be realized by engaging in earnings management. This earnings 
management often is associated with the level of accruals of a company. 
Accruals as a factor of earnings are the most studied determinant of 
earnings persistence.  
- Earnings smoothness. Earnings smoothness is a technique that allows 
managers to use their discretion to decrease the volatility of earnings, 
which affects stakeholders´ risk perception (Diri, 2017; Walker, 2013). 
Earnings smoothing allows managers to represent the fundamental 
performance in a more stable way, thus reducing uncertainty among 
investors (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005). Moreover, Ronen and Yari 
(2008) classify earnings smoothing into two categories: (i) “real earnings 
smoothing”, (ii) “artificial smoothing”. First the real earnings smoothing 
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includes activities related to the operations or investing activities as they 
are hard to be identified. Second, the artificial smoothing consists in 
intentionally overstate/understate firm´s earnings. Some authors (Ronen 
and Yari, 2008) also classified the consequences of earnings smoothing into 
beneficial, neutral and pernicious. Earnings smoothing is considered to be 
beneficial when it enhances the informativeness of earnings and leads to a 
more precise prediction of future earnings. Pernicious smoothing is the 
result of opportunistic behavior of managers to distort earnings and 
misrepresent them in order to hide bad news. Smoothing is considered to 
be neutral when it does not impact the cash flows. Earnings 
informativeness and quality have a great impact and lead to more volatile 
stock prices (Markarian & Gill-de-Albornoz, 2010). 
- Earnings response coefficient (ERC). This coefficient measures investors´ 
responsiveness to earnings in term of reaction on the firm’s value. If there 
is a high correlation with value this implies that earnings are more 
accurately reflecting fundamental performance of a company (P. Dechow 
et al., 2010)  
 
Dechow et al. (2010), identify six categories of determinants: (1) firm characteristics, 
(2) financial reporting practices, (3) governance and controls, (4) auditors, (5) equity 
market incentives, (6) external factors. 
 
(1) Dechow et al. (2010) highlight four firm characteristics which are associated to 
be proxies for earnings earning quality; firm performance, debt, firm growth 
and investment and fir size. Poorly performing firms are often associated to 
manage accounting tactics to improve their earnings, thus lowering earnings 
quality(Keating & Zimmerman, 1999). In case of highly leveraged firms, 
managers manipulate financial statements for instance to avoid the violation 
of debt covenants. Considering firm growth, prior research (Penman and 
Zhang, 2002) highlights that high growth firms report less persistent earnings. 




found a negative relationship between size and earnings quality as bigger 
companies adapt accounting method choices in response to the larger 
regulatory surveillance.  
(2) Earnings quality is affected by the accounting methods and principles used by 
companies. For instance earnings quality is affected whether financial 
information is reported via principles based or rules based methods. 
(3) The literature on governance and control mechanisms (Ashbaugh-Skaife, 
Collins, Kinney, & LaFond, 2008) emphasizes that internal controls and audit 
committees are negatively associated with earnings management (which 
increases earnings quality). 
(4) Auditors are considered as determinant of earnings quality as their role is to 
impede intentional and unintentional earnings manipulation. As such, firms 
with “Big-X” auditors report lower discretionary accruals than firms which 
do not have “Big-X” auditors (Kim, Chung, & Firth, 2003)  
(5) Prior research highlights that earnings quality is affected in periods where 
firms try to raise capital in the market (Dechow et al., 2010). In this case firms 
particularly manage their accrual choices and thus affect its earnings quality. 
(6) External factors which influence earnings quality include among others tax 
regulations, capital requirements and political processes. Moreover, past 
literature (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010) provides support that tax expense 
accrual is used to manage earnings. However, the extent to which firm can 




2.2.2. Definition and incentives of Earnings management 
This chapter examines the influence of different payment methods on earnings 
manipulation, applied by both acquirers and targets, and identifies the main 
incentives of firms to follow these practices. As M&A are of major importance for 
both firms (bidder and target) the public and private information is a major 
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determinant for the decision to engage in earnings manipulation. Hence, also the 
earnings quality and accuracy of the accounting information of both parties are 
relevant during the due diligence process.  
Earnings quality is crucial because it gives economic agents information about the 
performance of firms. Traditionally, the role of accounting information is grouped in 
a dual role: informativeness and stewardship (Ronen & Yaari, 2008) The 
informativeness, considers accounting information as a source of information 
needed by financial agents to forecast future cash flows. An issue related to the 
quality of information can be found in the moral hazard of managers given the 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Akerlof, 1970). 
Managers mostly act and base their decisions on what can provide them benefits. 
Therefore, often the accounting information is more useful for “providers of 
information” than real users (shareholders, stakeholders in general). This problem of 
diverging interest is referred to the principle agent problem. 
Earnings management use flexibility of accounting standards to manipulate 
earnings using private information (Sankar & Subramanyam, 2001). This means that 
earnings management is “still inside” the boundaries of the accounting and 
reporting standards and therefore does not include fraud. Earnings management has 
to be interpreted as an opportunistic behavior of managers to maximize simply their 
goals rather than the shareholders’ ones.  
 
Following Healy and Wahlen (1999), “Earnings management occurs when managers 
use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports 
to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers.” 
Compared to Healy and Wahlen, Joshua Ronen Varda Yaari (2008) highlight 
instead that earnings management is not always used to mislead stakeholders about 
the performance of a company. They define  
Earnings management is a collection of managerial decisions that result in not reporting the 




can be beneficial: it signals long-term value; pernicious: it conceals short- or long-term value; 
neutral: it reveals the short-term true performance. The managed earnings result from taking 
production/investment actions before earnings are realized or making accounting choices that 
affect the earnings numbers and their interpretation after the true earnings are realized. 
Therefore, earnings management uses a set of practices that allow managers to 
inflate/deflate the earnings inside these boundaries which is possible thanks to the 
grey lines in accounting standards. These type of actions include for instance to 
underestimate or overestimate impairments, provisions, expenses or to accelerate or 
delay sales using “accruals”. Contrarily fraud implicates a violation of accounting 
principles like for example to record frictions of revenues.  
Moreover, this work considers earnings management as the manipulation of 
earnings by the acquirer before the settlement of an acquisition.  
Several studies focus on how firms practice earnings management as well as its 
incentives. There are various incentives for firms to engage in earnings 
manipulation: (i) affect market value of a firm (ii) executive compensation incentives 
(iii) CEO turnover (iv) financial resources incentive 
One of the principal incentives which lead managers to alter reported earnings is to 
affect firm´s market value. In other words, managers may use their discretion to 
modify earnings to meet market expectations and analysts´ forecasts (Bartov & 
Cohen, 2009; Burgstahler & Eames, 2006). One of the strategies that managers use to 
meet market’s expectation is by applying income smoothing. Past literature argues 
that firms managers manipulate earnings to reduce volatility in earnings, thus 
avoiding significant decreases or losses that could impact price returns (Burgstahler 
& Dichev, 1999; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1995). Repeating constant levels of earnings 
signalizes a more stable environment and is associated with lower level of price 
volatility (Grant, Markarian, & Parbonetti, 2009). 
Another incentive to do earnings manipulation is related to executives’ 
compensation. In fact, earnings manipulation is more pronounced  in companies 
where executive compensation is dependent on firm performance (Grant et al., 
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2009). This is so, as managers try to maximize their own utility rather than 
maximizing shareholders ‘value or even firm value. Based on the agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) this issue involves two parties (agent and principal) which 
have diverging interests and private information. Shareholders are in general less 
risk averse, as they want to achieve stock price increases. Opposing, managers have 
a lower risk appetite and sometimes act more conservative. To align these interests, 
compensation packages of executives are designed based on performance. Usually, 
the compensation structure consists of different parts, a fixed salary (base payment), 
bonuses and stock options that will be added if certain goals are achieved by the 
firm. Shrieves and Gao (2002) analyze the intensity of earnings management in 
relation with the compensation package. They find that the intensity of earnings 
management is negatively related to salary and positively associated with stock 
options and bonuses (Shrieves & Gao, 2002).  
Another incentive is represented by CEO turnover which is positively associated 
to earnings management. Before to leave the company, the CEO can create the 
opportunity to inflate earnings to show better performance and to increase chances 
of a new job (Hazarika, Karpoff, & Nahata, 2012). When a new CEO arrives, he takes 
the advantage to deflate earnings, to lower expectations of shareholders thus 
facilitating to show better performances in the future (Ronen & Yaari 2008).  
Lastly, a company’s financial situation can be a key factor when managers 
consider entering in earnings management. Existing literature finds mixed evidence 
regarding which earnings management strategy financially constrained firms are 
pursuing.  
Dechow et al. (1996) examined the motives for and consequences of earnings 
management in a sample where firms are subject to punishments of the security and 
exchange commission (SEC). One important motivation they came up with was that 
companies manipulate earnings with to attract financing at lower cost. Further, they 
highlight that companies with weak governance structures are more likely to alter 
earnings. Companies having weak governance structures usually do not possess 




Lastly, they find that earnings manipulation, once identified by a regulator, leads to 
a severe increase of cost of capital. 
Moreover, firms with severe financial problems engage in earnings management 
to obtain sources of funding and find funding at a cheaper cost (Linck, Netter, & 
Shu, 2013). Campa et al. 2019, highlight that companies facing financial distress use 
more discretionary expenses (real activity management) than accruals management. 
This effect is even more pronounced when firms face extremely high level of 
leverage and debt access is tough. Relying on this idea, financially constrained firms 
instead of using the less costly earnings management practices use the strategy 
which is harder to be detected (Campa, 2019; Campa & Camacho-Miñano, 2015).  
Opposing this idea, Zang (2012) stipulates that companies confronted with 
financial difficulties, should opt for the earnings management strategy which 
destroys the least value of the firm which in this case would be the accrual based 
approach. This theory is confirmed by Haga et al. (2018) which endorses that 
financially stressed firms prefer accruals management over real activity management 
using an UK sample (Haga, Höglund, & Sundvik, 2018). Moreover, Linck et al. 
(2013) demonstrate that managers use discretionary accruals to ease financial 
constraint prior to investment opportunities to obtain financing at a cheaper cost. 
The authors underline that constrained companies experience higher discretionary 
accruals levels than unconstrained companies (Linck et al., 2013). Also, their results 
suggest that the strategic use of accruals manipulation increases investment 
efficiency for constrained firms that have wealth generating investment 
opportunities.  
 
2.2.3. Differences in manipulation practices via Accruals and Real 
activity management 
Companies can have distinct reactions in terms of earnings management, given their 
different structures (shareholder structure), financial health or status (listed or 
unlisted). Existing literature (Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2013) emphasize two different 
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hypotheses in relation to the behavior of firms when engaging in earnings 
management. The first hypothesis is the so-called demand hypothesis, which 
reckons that listed firms exhibit lower earnings management than unlisted 
companies due to the accurate financial information that needs to be provided to the 
stakeholders. The second hypothesis is related to the opportunistic behavior of a 
firm. The opportunistic behavior hypothesis stipulates that listed firms have more 
incentives than unlisted firms because they need to meet market expectations. 
Earnings management include many techniques among which two are 
particularly relevant; (i) Accruals activity management, (ii) Real activity 
management. 
Early research tends to focus exclusively on the role of accruals management to 
explain possible earnings management in firms. Accruals arise when there is a trade-
off between the timing of a cash flow and its recognition in the financial statements 
of a company. As such, accrual accounting is based on economic transactions which 
are recorded based on expected and not actual payments. This kind of manipulation 
is making use of interpretation of GAAP7. Accruals based earnings management 
does not involve changing the economics of a company but rather more the way of 
recognizing and presenting them. Accruals management impacts the claims of the 
cash flow but does not impact firm value as the latter one is determined by these 
cash flows (Walker, 2013). Examples of accrual management are early or wrong 
estimated revenues and/or expenses, over- understating assets or liabilities. 
Accelerating the recognition of revenues for instance by means of channel stuffing8 
can severely impact earnings of a company. This being said, the quality of 
accounting information becomes crucial again. Accurate accounting information 
facilitates company valuation and investment decisions.  
The evidence of literature on accruals earnings management in the field of 
mergers and acquisitions provides mixed results. Easterwood et al. (1997) 
(Easterwood, Seth, & Singer, 1997) and Erickson and Wang (1999) find that during 
                                                                    
7 GAAP, General Accepted Accounting Principles  
8 Channel stuffing, When a company forces in more products through a distribution channel than the channel 





the pre-merger period target’s abnormal accruals are positive but not statistically 
significant. On the other hand Anilowski et al. (2009) find evidence of a positive for 
earnings manipulation in target companies which are acquired via auctions.  
Focusing solely on accruals earnings management may not thoroughly 
highlight earnings management behavior of firms (Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 
2012). 
Besides the accruals management, the real activity management has caught 
attention over the past especially due to the works of (Graham et al., 2005) and 
Roychowdhury (2006). The latter one defines real earnings management as, 
“Management actions that deviate from normal business practices, undertaken with 
the primary objective of meeting certain earnings thresholds”.9 
Real earnings management includes: (i) overproduction to reduce fixed cost per 
unit, (ii) manipulating several expenses such as research and development (R&D) 
and advertising. Opposed to accruals, real activity management changes the free 
cash flow of the firm as some activities generating value are being sacrificed. Prior 
body of literature has shown the negative impact of real earnings management 
(Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008; Roychowdhury, Mizik, & Kothari, 2012) by influencing 
operating performance and stock returns.  
Generally, accrual manipulation is easier to implement but at the same time are 
easier to detect compared to the real activity management (Zang, 2012). Real activity 
management can possibly turn out costly for a firm as it is not simply departing 
from accounting standards. From an economic stand point, RAM are suboptimal 
transactions carried out by the firm which can have negative impact on firm 
performance and profitability (Chen, Yen, & Chang, 2009).  
More recent studies (Walker, 2013; Zang, 2012) highlight the usefulness of 
considering both approaches, accrual and real activity management as firms could 
use both strategies simultaneously. 
 
                                                                    
9 Real activity management definition, Roychowdhury (2006) page 336.  
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2.2.4. Accruals-based models and real activity manipulation models 
Numerous studies have used a variety of accruals prediction models for detecting 
earnings management. Earnings manipulation can be achieved via two different 
ways: (i) Accrual and (ii) Real activity management (RAM).  
We will first address the models for detecting accruals management before 
illustrating the models for detecting real activity management models.  
Before highlighting four of the most relevant models it is useful to define accruals 
as generally accepted by empirical literature. Dechow et al. (1995) define accruals as 
the difference between net income and operating cash flow. 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 , 
 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 represents total accruals for firm i in period t, 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 represents net income 
for firm i in period t, 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 represents operating cash flow for firm i in period t. 
According to Dechow et al. (1995) total accruals are computed as: 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = ∆𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝐷𝐿𝐶𝑄𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝑃𝑄𝑖𝑡  , 
 
where ∆𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑡 represents the change in current assets total for firm i in period t, 
∆𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡  represents the change in cash and short term investments for firm i in 
period t, ∆𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑡 represents the change in current liabilities total for firm i in period 
t, ∆𝐷𝐿𝐶𝑄𝑖𝑡 represents the change in debt in current liabilities for firm i in period t 
and 𝐷𝑃𝑄𝑖𝑡 represents depreciation and amortization for firm i in period t. 
 
The models will be presented according a chronological order. The first model is 
the Healy Model (1985). Healy (1985) represents discretionary accruals as the 
difference between total accruals and normal accruals. Plus, the model makes use of 












where, 𝑁𝐷?̂?𝑖𝑡 denotes the estimate of non-discretionary accruals for firm i in period 
t, 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑠 is the total accruals for firm i in period s, n is the number of years over which 
the average is taken (for Healy model this is set as 5 years). Following the previous 
equation, the estimate of discretionary accruals can be computed as  𝐷?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 −
𝑁𝐷?̂?𝑖𝑡 . Critics about this model include that accruals usually tend to reverse over 
time. Thus, average normal accruals can be equal to zero and normal accruals might 
be considered as discretionary in some years. 
The second model, from DeAngelo (1986), takes last year´s total accruals as a 
measure of normal accruals. Therefore, changes in accruals from one year to another 
are considered as discretionary. The algebraic form is given by; 
 
𝑁𝐷?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1  , 
 
where  𝑁𝐷?̂?𝑖𝑡  represents the estimate of non-discretionary accruals of firm i in 
period t, 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1  represents the total accruals for firm i in period t-1. Likewise, 
DeAngelo computes the estimate of discretionary accruals the same way as Healy 
(1985). By considering solely the past year and not the last 5 years as the Healy 
model, DeAngelo reduces serial correlation but still is not valid all the time 
(Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995).  
The most notable and one of the most applied models is the model presented by 
Jones (1991). The model starts by estimating a regression for total accruals of the 













+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡   , 
.  
where ∆𝑅𝑖𝑡  denotes the change in revenue for firm i in period t,  𝐴𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔  denotes 
average assets of firm i, 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 denotes gross value of property plant and equipment 




 After regressing this equation, the estimates of the coefficients are used to 
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where  𝑁𝐷?̂?𝑖𝑡  represents the estimate of non-discretionary accruals for firm i in 
period t. To obtain the estimate of the discretionary accruals the difference between 












where 𝐷?̂?𝑖𝑡 represents the estimate of discretionary accruals for firm i in period t. In 
all the regressions, an intercept is included and all variables are scaled by average 
total assets of the beginning and ending asset balance. This is made to avoid 
heteroscedasticity problems.  
Despite being one of the most relevant models (Jones, 1991), it suffers some 
limitations. Moreover, the model does not consider other expenses as explanatory 
variables even though they influence total accruals. There is a problem of omitted 
variables leading to endogeneity and biasness of the model. The omission of relevant 
variables results in having a model which does not sufficiently explain earnings 
management (Yaari et al., 2007). The problem is related to the endogeneity which 
will bias the results. 
Subsequently, to resolve and mitigate some of the weaknesses of the initial Jones 
model, Dechow et al. (1995) developed a new model based on the Jones model. It is 
commonly referred to as the modified Jones model. It starts by capturing the effects 


















where ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 represents the change in account receivable for firm i in period t. The 
estimates of the coefficients are then used to determine an estimate of the accruals 
adjusting this time the change in revenues for the change in receivable. The algebraic 













  , 
where 𝑁𝐷?̂?𝑖𝑡  represents the estimate of non-discretionary accruals for firm i in 
period t. The estimate of discretionary accruals is obtained by the same way as 
before, considering the difference between firm´s total accruals and the estimate of 
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where 𝐷?̂?𝑖𝑡 denotes an estimate of discretionary accruals for firm i in period t.   
In all the regressions, an intercept is included and all variables are scaled by 
average total assets of the beginning and ending asset balance. Again, this is made to 
avoid heteroscedasticity problems.  
Overall, the modified Jones model mitigates some shortcomings of the former 
Jones model by allowing the possibility of manipulating accounts receivable in the 
event periods. Nevertheless, it overlooks the before mentioned fact in the estimation 
period leading to inconsistent results. To face this particular issue, some researchers 
(Dechow, Richardson, & Tuna, 2003; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005) adopt a cross-
sectional version of the modified Jones model allowing for adjustment in the 
estimation and event period.  
Additionally to the above listed models, other models have been developed over 
the years including the Forward-Looking Model (Dechow et al., 2003), the 
Competing-component model (Kang & Sivaramakrishnan, 1995) the Cash-Flows 
Model (Dechow & Dichev, 2002) the Performance-Matching Model (Kothari et al., 
2005) and the Stubben Model (Stubben, 2010). All reported models try to solve the 
persisting limits of the Jones Model. Each model focuses on specific factors, which 
are considered to have a relative more important impact. As such, choosing the best 
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measurement model for explaining accruals earnings management remains a 
subjective and contextual of each research. Using a multitude of models may be 
helpful to analyze and obtain more reliable results.  
Alternatively, instead of opting for accruals earnings management model, real 
earnings management models can give an additional, complementary explanation. 
The most referred models in literature are the Roychowdhury (2006) and the Gunny 
(2010)’s models.  
The Roychowdhury model (2006) is based on the work of Dechow et al. (1995) 
and is one of the most frequently employed measurement methods for non-financial 
sectors. It embodies three components. Firstly, it analyzes the decrease in operating 
cash flow as a consequence of high amount of discounts to boost sales volume and 














+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡  , 
 
where  𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 denotes operating cash flows for firm i in period t, 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 represents 
the sales of the firm i in period t, ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 represents the change in sales during the 
period t for firm i. To avoid heteroscedasticity, all variables are scaled by average 
total assets.  
The estimate of abnormal operating cash flows are computed based on the 
difference between the estimates of normal operating cash flows and the actual 
operating cash flows. For illustrative purposes, an upward earnings management 
needs to be multiplied by -1. 
𝑁𝐶𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔
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where 𝑁𝐶𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡 represents the estimate of normal operating cash flows for firm i in 














where 𝐴𝐶𝐹?̂?𝑖𝑡 represents the estimate of abnormal operting cash flows for firm i in 
period t.  
Secondly, accordingly to the model, the second component is illustrated by the 
decrease in discretionary expenses which improves earnings and cash flows. These 
expenses include R&D or advertising. The model starts to establish discretionary 
expenses based on the regression shown below: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑔






+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡  , 
 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡  denotes discretionary expenses for firm i in period t, 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 
denote sales for firm i in period 𝑡 − 1. Again, all variables are scaled by the average 
of total assets. 
The estimates of abnormal discretionary expenses are obtained by subtracting the 
actual discretionary expenses by the estimate of normal discretionary expenses.  The 
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where 𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐸𝑥𝑝̂ 𝑖𝑡 represents the estimates of normal discretionary expenses for firm 
i in period t. To obtain the estimate of abnormal discretionary expenses the 
difference between actual discretionary expenses and the estimate of normal 











where 𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐸𝑥𝑝̂ 𝑖𝑡  represents the estimate of abnormal discretionary expenses for 
firm i in period t.  
The last component of the model addresses the increased inventory, which as 
mentioned in the previous part can be done via channel stuffing, reducing the cost of 


















+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
 
where  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 denotes the production cost which includes COGS (cost of goods sold) 
for firm i in period t, Sales 𝑡−1 represents the change in sales for firm i during the 
period 𝑡 − 1 . As in all the other equations, variables are scaled by average total 
assets. 
This model is very informative and treats different aspect of real earnings 
management. However, it suffers from an omitted variables problem as well as it 
does not fit very small sample because it would violate an OLS assumption 
regarding the normal distribution of the error term.  
At last but not least, the Gunny Model (2010) tries to capture real earnings 
management following four types of activity management: (i) decrease of 
discretionary R&D, (ii) decrease of discretionary selling, general and administrative 
expenses, (iii) timing of fixed asset sales to report gain, (iv) overproduction to reduce 
cost of goods sold. Even though the model includes more variables trying to explain 
real activity management it still suffers from endogeneity issues and does not suit 
small samples. Given the current research, only few models have been developed in 
this area.  
To conclude on the models of earnings management, Zang (2012) introduces a 
combination of both earnings management models. The basic idea behind the model 
is to combine two models, the Roychowdhury model (2006) to measure real activity 
management and the Jones model (1991) to capture the effect of accruals 
management. The model relies on a sequential approach of both earnings 
management activities. Moreover, Zang (2012) argues that accruals activities are 
performed after the year end whereas real activity management occurs during the 
financial year.  
It is important to notice, that both earnings manipulation practices can happen at 





2.2.5. The effects of the different methods of payment on Earnings 
management 
As both bidders and sellers possess private information relative to its true value, 
information asymmetry arises and impacts the terms of the agreement. Based on this 
asymmetry of information, Akerlof´s (1970) theory suggests that a bidder believes 
that a target only accepts the offer if the price is exceeding the true value of the 
company. Given this environment, bidders themselves would discount the value of 
the target for avoiding adverse selection. Likewise, targets have incentives to 
manipulate earnings to compensate the discount applied by the bidder. 
As bidders and target are aware of the valuation issue derived from private 
information, the payment method has great importance as it guarantees a better 
execution of the deal. For all-stock acquisitions, the payment of the purchase price is 
made by offering a specified number of shares of the bidder for each share of the 
target. The exact number of shares is determined by what is called the exchange 
ratio. 
It is shown by prior literature (Erickson & Wang, 1999; Henock, 2004) that non-
cash bidders have more incentives to manipulate earnings before approaching a 
target firm. Moreover, Erickson and Wang (1999) find that bidders manage earnings 
in periods prior to the merger and acquisition deal. Also, they highlight a positive 
relation between income increases and the relative size of the agreement. In other 
words, the bigger the deal in terms of value, the more acquirers tend to increase their 
earnings. 
Following the idea of Erickson and Wang (1999), Henock (2004) studied the 
performance of acquiring firms post-merger and found strong evidence that bidders 
overstate their earnings a quarter before a stock acquisition deal. Further, the author 
finds evidence that post-merger underperformance of acquiring firms is related to 
pre-merger earnings management. 
For acquirers offering a stock as method of payment inflating earnings to increase 
stock price has several advantages. First, by doing so the acquirer would need to 
issue fewer shares to close the transaction. Second, for current shareholders of the 
bidding firm this would mean a reduced dilution effect as well as a lower cost of the 
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acquisition. On the other hand, for target companies earnings manipulation is a 
rather difficult action. The idea is that targets have difficulty to anticipate either 
when nor if they will be acquired (Skaife & Wangerin, 2013). Its disposition to inflate 
earnings relies heavily on its capability to foresee a potential offer of a bidder. 
Nevertheless, target firms have incentives to increase pre-merger earnings to push 
the total consideration of the agreement up. Existing literature (Campa & Hajbaba, 
2016; Elnahas et al., 2017) demonstrates that targets firm do manipulate before 
takeovers especially by cutting discretionary expenses.  
For acquisitions involving earnout as method of payment Viarengo et al. (2016) 
provide evidence that there is a negative relationship between earnings management 
and the inclusion of earnout in the acquisition. Therefore, acquirers, which want to 
include earnout in the acquisition deal will manipulate less to show higher earnings 
quality. This means acquirers’ past earnings quality is a proxy of the acquirer’s 
reliability for the target.  When examining the role of target earnings management in 
earnout acquisitions, Elnahas et al. (2017) highlight that, after the settlement of the 
deal, target companies manipulate earnings by cutting discretionary expenses 
during the earnout period.  
 
 
3. Research Hypotheses 
Previous studies suggest that companies manage earning prior to stock-for-stock 
mergers (Erickson & Wang, 1999; Louis 2004). It is known that companies engage in 
manipulating activities to alter the total consideration of the transaction. Moreover, 
prior to M&A deals, acquirers and bidders try to inflate their earnings, share price as 
much as possible to affect the total deal value. 
 There can be significant differences in the degree of manipulation when we look 
closer at the financial health of bidders. Following the study of Linck et al. (2013) 
constrained acquirers ease financial constraints to obtain more funding and to be 




investment opportunity (otherwise bidders would not follow M&A), constrained 
bidders should report higher levels of earnings manipulation (via accruals and 
discretionary expenses) compared to unconstrained bidders. 
For this, we would expect a higher level of earning manipulation by constrained 
acquirers than unconstrained acquirers. 
 
Therefore, we hypothesize our hypothesis as follows: 
  
H1: Acquirers that are financially constrained are associated to higher level of 
earnings management before the acquisition via accruals and discretionary expenses. 
 
The second hypothesis which is going to be tested is linked to the earnout payments. 
Earnout contracts, despite being complex to design and to use, effectively help to 
mitigate some of the risks involved in acquisitions such as the valuation gap 
between bidders and acquirers and the adverse selection risk. These risks are more 
pronounced when such transactions involve a public bidder and a private target. As 
accurate financial and accounting information are particularly hard to obtain, linking 
part of the total consideration to a contingent payment eliminates part of the 
valuation risk. Method of payments such as all-cash, all-stock and mixed payments 
cannot effectively reduce the risk of overestimation of the target’s equity value. For 
this reason, in presence of disagreement between both parties (Kohers & Ang, 2000), 
due to the high information asymmetry on the real value attributed to the target, the 
two companies could decide to include the earnout in the deal.  
Earnout as method of payment reduces the incentive and level of earnings 
management as it reduces the information asymmetry and facilitates valuation of the 
target firm (Viarengo & Prencipe, 2016) which in our case is private or a subsidiary. 
Following the idea of Viarengo et al. (2016), targets carefully monitor the earnings 
quality of an acquirer prior to the acquisition to control that the acquirers will be 
able to meet the pre-specified earnout requirements. A higher level of earnings 
quality (meaning less earnings manipulation), prior to the deal, signals a greater 
level of confidence in the bidder from the side of the target.  
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Therefore we hypothesize our hypothesis as follows: 
 
H2: Acquisitions that include earnout are associated to lower levels of earnings 
management in the acquirer’s past financial statement (both via accruals and 
discretionary expenses).  
  
The third hypothesis is looking at the earnings manipulation in earnout acquisitions 
which include extreme cases of uncertainty. This includes acquisitions where 
bidders and targets are not in the same industry (diversification), operating in 
different countries (foreign) or where targets are private companies (private). Prior 
research (Vasilescu & Millo, 2016) dealing with target companies highlights that 
there is a difference between industrial and geographic diversification when it comes 
to the degree of information asymmetry. Their results suggest that geographic 
diversification is related to a higher degree of earnings manipulation; however the 
results are not statistically significant. Other studies suggest that (Barbopoulos, 
Paudyal, & Sudarsanam, 2017; Cain et al., 2011; Kohers & Ang, 2000) earnouts are 
particularly useful in deals involving high level of asymmetry of information. These 
deals are considered to be of higher risk, thus companies prefer to be protected 
against adverse post acquisition performances. Based on the idea of Viarengo et al. 
(2016) bidders using earnout, in these acquisitions, will show higher past earnings 
quality to show their trustworthiness. 
 
Therefore, the third hypothesis states as follows: 
 
H3a: Cross-border acquisitions (compared with same-border) that include earnout are 
associated to lower levels of earnings management in the acquirer’s past financial 
statement (via both accruals and discretionary expenses). 
 
H3b: Diversified acquisitions (compared with undiversified) that include earnout are 
associated to lower levels of earnings management in the acquirer’s past financial 




4. Econometric Method 
4.1. Measuring earnings management 
In order to evaluate the research hypotheses we have to quantify earnings 
management. Earnings management can be done via accruals and real activity 
management. Therefore we present two models: (i) The modified-Jones Model (1995) 
(ii) Roychowdhury model (2006). 
 
The first model is the Modified Jones Model which captures discretionary accruals 
and includes the following key variables. Dechow et al. (1995) suggest that modified-
Jones model provides the most powerful model for detecting earnings management. 
















+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡  , 
 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 defines total accruals for firm i in quarter t, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 defines total assets for 
firm i in quarter t-1, 𝑄𝑗 represents a binary variable that takes the value of one for 
quarter j and 0 otherwise, ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 defines the quarterly change in sales for firm i in 
quarter t, ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  defines the quarterly change in accounts receivable for firm i in 
quarter t, 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 defines property plant and equipment for firm i in quarter t and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
defines the error term for firm i in quarter t which captures discretionary accruals.  
This follows the notation of prior applied studies in the field of earnings 
management (Dechow et al., 1995; Viarengo et al., 2016; Elnahas et al., 2017) which 
also use lagged total assets rather than the assets average (Diri, 2017). 
Accordingly total accruals are computed as the change in non-cash current assets 





𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = ∆𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝐷𝐿𝐶𝑄𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝑃𝑄𝑖𝑡  , 
 
where ∆𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑡 represents the change in current assets total for firm i in quarter t, 
∆𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡  represents the change in cash and short term investments for firm i in 
quarter t, ∆𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑡  represents the change in current liabilities total for firm i in 
quarter t, ∆𝐷𝐿𝐶𝑄𝑖𝑡 represents the change in debt in current liabilities for firm i in 
quarter t, 𝐷𝑃𝑄𝑖𝑡 represents depreciation and amortization for firm i in quarter t.  
 
The next step is to compute an estimate of discretionary accruals as the residual, 
𝑒𝑖𝑡, of the modified-Jones model. Therefore, for each firm-quarter the estimate of 
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where 𝑁𝐷?̂?𝑖𝑡 denotes the estimate of non-discretionary accruals for firm i in quarter 
t. The difference between total accruals and the estimate of non-discretionary 
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where 𝐷?̂?𝑖𝑡 represents the estimate of discretionary accruals for firm i in quarter t.  
The second model which is used is the RAM model (real activity management) 
regarding abnormal discretionary expenses. To estimate the RAM model we use the 
model defined by Roychowdhury (2006) where discretionary expenses are defined 
as the sum of R&D expenses, advertising expenses and sales, general and 
administrative expenses (SG&A). As well as for the first model, the model is 




=  𝛾0 + 𝛾1 (
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛾2 (
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1





where 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡  defines discretionary expenses for firm i for quarter t, 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 
defines sales for firm i in quarter t-1, 𝜑𝑖𝑡 defines the error term for firm i in quarter t, 
which captures abnormal discretionary expenses.   
Following Roychodhury (2006) and Elnahas et al. (2017), we divide the variables 
by lagged total assets rather than by average assets (Diri, 2017).  Then for each firm-
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where 𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑠𝐸𝑥𝑝̂ 𝑖𝑡 represents the estimate of non-discretionary expenses for firm i in 
quarter t. The difference between the actual and the non-discretionary expenses 
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where 𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑠𝐸𝑥𝑝̂ 𝑖𝑡 represents the estimate of abnormal discretionary expenses for firm 
i in quarter t. 
After computing the discretionary accruals and abnormal discretionary expenses as 
the residuals of the respective equation, we are ready to evaluate the hypotheses 





| = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜃3𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜃4𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜃5𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃8𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡







| = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇2𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜇3𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜇4𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜇5𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇8𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜇9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇10𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 
 
where |𝐷?̂?𝑖𝑡/𝐴𝑖𝑡−1| represents the estimate of absolute discretionary accruals for firm 
i in quarter t, |𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑠𝐸𝑥𝑝̂ 𝑖𝑡/𝐴𝑖𝑡−1|  represents the estimate of absolute  abnormal 
discretionary expenses for firm i in quarter t, 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable which 
takes the value of 1 if firm i is involved in an acquisition in quarter t+1, 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if  firm i  is 
constrained in quarter t-1, 0 otherwise, 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable which takes 
the value of 1 if the payment method chosen by firm i for the acquisition of quarter 
t+1 is earnout, 0 otherwise, 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡 represents a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the target of firm i in the acquisition of quarter t+1 is not from the US, 0 
otherwise, 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑡 represents a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
target of firm i in the acquisition of quarter t+1 is in a different two-digit SIC 
industry, 0 otherwise, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 represents a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 if the target of firm i in the acquisition of quarter t+1 is private, 0 otherwise. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 
represents the natural logarithm of total assets for firm i in quarter t, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 represents 
the leverage measured as total debt divided by total assets for firm i in quarter t , 
𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡 represents the Book to Market ratio for firm i in quarter t, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  represents 
return on assets calculated as Income before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets for firm i in quarter t, 𝑁𝑒𝑔_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 represents a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if firm i has a negative ROA in quarter t-4 and t-8, 0 otherwise. 
 
The coefficient of 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝑡 will answer H1, of whether constrained 
acquirers manipulate more than unconstrained acquirers. The answer to the H2 is 




𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡  and 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑡  are 





5. Estimation Results 
5.1. Data and Sample 
The theoretical part of this work aims at better understanding how acquirers and 
more specifically constrained acquirers manage earnings prior and post acquisitions. 
Further, it puts light on the usage of the earnout contract as payment method and 
the role in the mitigation of earnings management.  
Consequently, the sample consists of acquisitions of private targets or subsidiaries 
completed by United States listed/public companies between 01/01/1996 and 
15/07/2014.  The data for the acquisition dates as well as the countries of both 
bidders and sellers are obtained from the Reuters ThomsonOne database. 
The sample is restricted to takeover bids where the acquirer is pursuing majority 
control (at least 50%) of the target. More specifically, for a bid to be included in the 
sample, several criteria must be met; 
1. Acquirer is a U.S. company listed on NASDAQ or NYSE and has a market 
capitalization not less than 1 million US dollars.  
2. Bidders and targets are not from financial services (SIC 6000-6999). This sector 
is dropped because of the heavy regulatory environment.  
3. Target companies are not publicly traded but are classified as private or 
subsidiary. This restriction is applied in order to focus on acquisition deals 
where the asymmetry of information is heavier. As a consequence, the 
importance of earnout for mitigating the information problem is enhanced.  
4. Payment methods are classified as only cash, stock, mixed payment a 
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combination of cash and stock and earnout. 
 
Accounting information of the relevant variables are obtained from Compustat 
database. To estimate discretionary accruals and abnormal discretionary expenses, 




5.2. Estimation of Discretionary Accruals and Abnormal 
discretionary expenses 
To test the research hypotheses, discretionary accruals are calculated following the 
literature by using the modified Jones Model (1995) and the abnormal discretionary 
expenses are computed using the Roychowdhury model (2006). Using a model for 
each type of earnings management (Accruals and real activity management), we are 
able to get a broader understanding of the behavior of the acquirers.  
 
 
5.3. Definition of constrained acquirers 
Previous studies came up with several measurement criteria to classify a firm as 
constrained but overall there is no universally accepted classification. In this paper 
we will follow the classification proposed by Linck et al. (2013). Moreover, six 
measures of constraints are used to classify bidders in two groups.10 
The first one is the SA Index suggested by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). The SA 
Index is composed as follow:  −0.737𝑥𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 0.043𝑥𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒2 − 0.040𝑥𝐴𝑔𝑒, where Size is 
the natural log of book assets (in millions of dollars) and Age is the number of years, 
from the first year, a firm has a non-missing stock price in Compustat. The bottom 
(top) 30% is considered unconstrained (constrained).  
                                                                    




The second criterion is Net Leverage (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010; Kaplan & Zingales, 
1997). Net Leverage is computed as net debt, sum of long term and short term debt 
minus excess cash, scaled by sum of net debt and shareholder´s equity. Firms which 
experience negative net debt are classified as unconstrained.  
The third criterion is the Free Cash Flow where top 30% of firms FCF are 
considered unconstrained. The free cash flow is obtained from the cash from 
operations minus average CAPEX in the past three years, scaled by the sum of long 
term and short term debt.  
The next criteria are a company’s bond rating (Almeida 2004), dividend payout 
ratio (Almeida, 2004) and operating cash flow (Hadlock and Pierce 2010). If a 
company has (has not) a bond credit rating it is considered as unconstrained 
(constrained). For the dividend payout ratio the top (bottom) 30% are considered 
unconstrained (constrained) which is also true for the operating cash flow.  
For each firm, the six criteria are used and a point is attributed if a firm is 
constrained, zero otherwise. The constraint score is the sum of a firm´s six criteria. A 
company showing a constraint score equal or above 3 is considered as constrained. 
 
5.4. Descriptive statistics 
The final sample consists of 753 acquisitions from 1996 until 2014. Table 1 shows 
descriptive statistics for the main variables adopted in the empirical analysis. The 
number of observations is equal to 31,341. By looking at the data of Table 1 the 
average bidder shows, in terms of lagged assets, 2.6% and 4% of absolute 
discretionary accruals and absolute abnormal discretionary expenses, respectively. 
In the sample, 0.5% of acquirers are constrained prior to the acquisition. Also, 0.5% 
of acquirers use earnout as payment method for the acquisition. The use of earnout 
is equal in acquisitions which involve industrial diversification as well as 
geographical diversification (0.1%). Table 1 shows that on average 0.4% of acquirers 
use earnout as payment method when the target firm is a private company. The 
average acquirer’s size is of approximately USD 271 million dollars and has a level 
of leverage of 18.2% of total assets. The book-to-market ratio is relatively high (>1) 
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which indicates that the average acquirer is undervalued. Bidders on average report 
negative return on assets which indicates less assets efficiency. Lastly, on average 
21.6% of the acquirers demonstrate two year of consecutive negative return on assets 
prior to acquisition. 
 
Table 1- Descriptive statistics 
Number of observations= 31,341 
     Mean   Median   min   max 
Absolute Dis Acc 0.026 0.017 0.000 0.247 
Absolute Abn DisExp 0.040 0.030 0.000 0.437 
Constrained x Acqyear 0.005 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Earnout x Acqyear 0.005 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Earnout x Acqyear x Foreign 0.001 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Earnout x Acqyear x Diversif 0.001 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Earnout x Acqyear x Priv 0.004 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Size 5.601 5.560 0.005 11.774 
Leverage 0.182 0.112 0.000 20.349 
Booktomarketratio 3.800 2.152 -797.217 5603.074 
ROA -0.003 0.009 -4.553 3.114 
Neg ROA 0.216 0.000 0.000 1.000 
          
 
 
5.5. Preliminary analysis 
Table 2 reports t-test results for absolute discretionary accruals and absolute 
abnormal discretionary expenses for the four groups of the research hypotheses. No 
statistical significance is reported in these preliminary results. The results for H1, 
related to the constrained and unconstrained group, suggest that constrained 
acquirers do not manipulate significantly more than unconstrained acquirers via 
accruals. However, the sign suggest that constrained acquirers manipulate less even 
if this is not statistically significant. Opposing, it seems that constrained bidders 
report higher absolute abnormal discretionary expenses prior to acquisition than 
unconstrained acquirers.   
 Acquirers which use earnout as method of payment present lower absolute 




show earnings quality to the counterpart (Viarengo et al., 2016). However, when 
examining the abnormal discretionary expenses, bidders using earnout show higher 
values than non-earnout bidders.  
 Looking at cross-border acquisitions which involve earnout as method of 
payment (variable foreign), acquirers have higher discretionary accruals and lower 
abnormal discretionary expenses. The mixed evidence leads to a partial rejection of 
H3a which stipulates that these acquisitions involve lower levels of earnings 
management.  For H3b, which involve earnout as method of payment and industrial 
diversification, acquirers show lower level of earnings management for both, 
discretionary accruals and abnormal discretionary expenses.  
According to the preliminary analysis, all of the hypotheses show mixed evidence 
and no statistical significance. The results suggest no differences in earnings 
management constrained acquirers and unconstrained acquirers as well as for 

















Table 2 - Preliminary analysis 
 T-test for key variables. P-values are reported between parentheses. The number of observation per 
group is the following: Constrained=155 Unconstrained=31,186. For Earnout=154  and Non-
Earnout=31,187. Foreign=27 Non-foreign=31,314. Diversification=42 Non-diversification=31,299 
 
  Panel A.  Panel B. 
  




   Constrained 0.024 0.041 
Unconstrained 0.026 0.040 
Difference -0.002 0.001 
 
(0.376) (0.794) 
   
   Earnout 0.023 0.045 
Non-Earnout 0.026 0.040 
Difference -0.003 0.005 
 
(0.132) (0.173) 
   
   Foreign 0.028 0.034 
Domestic 0.026 0.040 
Difference 0.002 -0.006 
 
(0.792) (0.404) 
   
   Diversification 0.022 0.037 
Same-Industry 0.026 0.040 
Difference -0.004 -0.003 
 
(0.364) (0.592) 










5.6. Regression Results 
Table 3 shows the results of the regressions shown in Section 4. For specification (1) 
the dependent variable is absolute discretionary accruals. The dependent variable 
for specification (2) is absolute abnormal discretionary expenses. To estimate the 
regressions, industry and year-quarter fixed effects are included. The latter ones are 
taken into consideration as variables are based on annual and quarterly data. 
Further, the regression results are reported using clustered standard errors for firms.  
Overall, the results suggest a rejection of H1. There is no evidence that 
constrained acquirers report higher levels of earnings management in their past 
financial statements than unconstrained acquirers neither via discretionary accruals 
nor via abnormal discretionary expenses. The variable “Constrained x Acqyear” 
shows no significance for discretionary accruals and for abnormal discretionary 
expenses. Constrained bidders may be reluctant to manipulate more due to the risk 
and probability of being caught by a control authority. As stated by Dechow, Sloan, 
& Sweeney (1996) once a company has been identified to engage in earnings 
management, it is subject to penalties which ultimately increase the cost of capital 
worsening even more the financial situation. Furthermore, following the “demand 
hypothesis” (Hope et al., 2013) listed companies need to provide accurate and 
reliable accounting information to the stakeholders, which can be an additional 
reason why constrained acquirers do not engage more aggressively in earnings 
management. It seems that constrained acquirers prefer to accept a higher cost of 
financing rather than manipulating more. Moreover, constrained acquirers may opt 
for other payment methods which engender less earnings manipulation. Bates et al. 
(2018) shows that constrained bidders are more likely to use earnout compared to 
other methods of payments. According to Bates et al. (2018), earnouts are a source of 
financing for bidders with restricted access to external capital.  
The coefficient estimate in specification (1) yields significant support to H2 with a 
significance of 5%. The result indicates that acquirers using earnout  reduce earnings 
manipulation one year prior to acquisition. Acquirers using earnouts as method of 
payment are associated with lower levels of absolute discretionay accruals in the 
past financial statements. Therefore, the result indicates that companies increase 
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earnings qualtiy (reduce manipulation) by having lower levels of absolute 
discretionary accruals. The result follows the idea highlighted by Viarengo et al. 
(2016) that acquirers try to show greater earnings quality to show that targets can 
trust the bidders’ reported performances. As noted by the Viarengo et al. (2016), 
earnings quality of the bidder is a crucial determinant for the inclusion of earnout 
clauses in the transaction. From specification (2), the level of absolute abnormal 
discretionary expenses seems not to be different between acquirers (in general) that 
use earnout and acquirers that do not use earnout. 
The results from specification (1) show no impact for H3a and H3b, meaning 
bidders using earnout in acquisitions where the target is foreign or diversified do 
not manipulate less via discretionary accruals. However, H3a as well as H3b are 
supported in specification (2) with a statistical significance of 5% and 10% 
respectively. This means that bidders using earnouts in acquisitions involving 
foreign and diversified targets have lower absolute abnormal discretionary expenses 
in comparaison with bidders involved with non-foreign and non-diversified targets. 
As earnings management is considered to be an inverse proxy of earnings quality, 
(Viarengo et al., 2016) the bidder’s past financial statements are a reliable source to 
evaluate a bidder’s trustworthiness. The trustworthiness of the bidder gives to the 
target a positive signal which increases the probability of inclusion of earnouts in the 
acquisition deal. The use of earnout helps to brdige the valuation gap and reduces 











Table 3 - Regression results  
This table reports coefficient estimates for acquirers’ earnings manipulation. P-values are between 
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. N= 






Variables  (1) (2) 
Constrained x Acqyear 0,002 0,002 
 
(0,487) (0,523) 
Earnout x Acqyear -0,009** 0,009 
 
(0,037) (0,181) 
Earnout x Acqyear x Foreign 0,008 -0,014** 
 
(0,146) (0,020) 
Earnout x Acqyear x Diversif 0,001 -0,011* 
 
(0,713) (0,091) 
Earnout x Acqyear x Private 0,003 -0,005 
 
(0,481) (0,508) 
Size -0,004*** -0,004*** 
 
(0,000) (0,000) 
 Leverage 0,006*** 0,007* 
 
(0,000) (0,064) 
Book-to-Market 0,000 0,000* 
 
(0,266) (0,081) 
 ROA -0,025*** -0,055*** 
 
(0,000) (0,000) 






  Year-quater fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
R-squared 0,112 0,166 












While there is ample support on acquirers and targets engaging in earnings 
manipulation prior to the acquisition, this work contributes to the literature by 
examining if constrained acquirers manipulate more than unconstrained ones. 
Further it contributes to the growing literature of earnout use, specifically its role in 
reducing earnings management and increasing the earnings quality of an acquirer.  
To do so, two models of earnings management are used; the first model involves 
accruals (Modified-Jones Model, 1995) and the second model focuses on the real 
activity management (Roychowdhury, 2006) 
 The results show no statistical evidence that constrained acquirers do manipulate 
more than unconstrained ones. This can be explained by the fact that constrained 
acquirers do not want to bear the risk of getting caught in earnings management 
leading to future penalties, thus worsening the financial situation.  
The analysis also underpins the role of earnout in mitigating earnings 
manipulation. Earnout agreements are an instrument which helps to mitigate 
information asymmetry between both parties thus helping to bridge the valuation 
gap. Besides this, the results elucidate that acquirers using earnouts exhibit higher 
earnings quality thus sending a positive signal to the target company. The higher 
earning quality is obtained as bidders are engaging less in discretionary accruals 
manipulation whereas the real activity management model does not show any 
significant evidence. Lastly, it has been shown that bidders using earnout in foreign 
and diversifying acquisitions, show lower levels of earnings manipulation compared 
to acquirers which are involved in domestic and same-industry acquisitions. In this 
case a higher level of earning quality is achieved as bidders using earnout report 
lower levels of absolute abnormal discretionary accruals.  
To conclude, this work has shown that financial constraints are not an indicator of 
higher earnings manipulation. Plus, it highlights the usefulness of earnouts in 
reducing earnings management (via accruals and real activity management) in the 




Future studies can examine whether the size of an acquirer, which uses earnout as 
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Appendix A.  
 
Construction of Annual Constraint Measures 
Criterion Definition Classification 
SA Index −0,737xAge + 0,043xSize2 − 0,040xAge 
Top (bottom) 30 
percent firms are 
constrained 
(unconstrained) 
Net Leverage Net Debt/ (Net Debt + Eq uity) 
Firms with negative 
Net Debt are 
unconstrained 
Free Cash Flow (Cash Flows- Ave.Past Investment)/ Total Debt 
Bottom (top) 30 
percent firms are 
constrained 
(unconstrained) 
Bond Rating Firm's bond credit rating 
Firms without 
(with) credit ratings 
are constrained 
(unconstrained) 
Dividend Payout Ratio Dividens/ Net Income 
Bottom (top) 30 
percent firms are 
constrained 
(unconstrained) 
Operating Cash Flows Operating Cash flows/ Lag(PPE) 
Bottom (top) 30 
percent firms are 
constrained 
(unconstrained) 
Constraint Score  
Sum of constraint variables (SA Index Net 
Leverage…) 
Firms with a score 
of three or more 
are constrained.  








Definition of accounting items 
Age 
Number of years from the first year that a 
firm has a stock price in Compustat 
Ave. Past Investment Average(Capex) -1 to -3 
Cash Flows  OANCF 
Operating Cash Flows IB + DP 
Property Plant and 
Equipment PPENT 
Total Debt DLTT + DLC 
Net Debt DLTT + DLC - Excess Cash 
Excess Cash CHE - Max[LCT-(ACT-CHE),0] 
Dividends (DVC+DVP)/Lag(PPENT) 
Equity SEQ 
Net Income NI 
Size  AT 
    
 
